# A threat-focused approach in cyber risk management

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### Incorporating a threat mindset in cyber risk management

#### **Step 1: Threat Modeling**

Identifying threats that are prevalent to the system/application under review

#### Step 2: Cyber Risk Assessment

Connecting identified threats with the resulting cyber risks to the environment

#### Step 3: Risk Scoring Methodology

Utilizing a quantitative threat-driven methodology for defining the risk scoring

# **Threat Modeling**

# What is threat modeling?

"Threat modeling works to identify, communicate, and understand threats

and mitigations within the context of protecting something of value.

- Threat modeling can help make your technical setup more secure and trustworthy.
- Can be applied to a wide range of things, including systems, applications, networks, business processes, etc.
- Can be done at any stage of development, preferably early so that the findings can inform the design.
- Using threat modeling to think about security requirements can lead to proactive architectural decisions that help reduce threats from the start.

### **Threat modeling frameworks**



= To be analyzed in further detail

### **Threat modeling - STRIDE**



	Threat	Property Violated	Threat Definition
S	Spoofing identify	Authentication	Pretending to be something or someone other than yourself
т	Tampering with data	Integrity	Modifying something on disk, network, memory, or elsewhere
R	Repudiation	Non-repudiation	Claiming that you didn't do something or were not responsible; can be honest or false
1	Information disclosure	Confidentiality	Providing information to someone not authorized to access it
D	Denial of service	Availability	Exhausting resources needed to provide service
E	Elevation of privilege	Authorization	Allowing someone to do something they are not authorized to do

## **Threat modeling - PASTA**

Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis

The framework consists of **seven** stages

*Risk-centric framework which employs an attacker-centric perspective.* 

It elevates the threat-modeling process to a strategic level by involving key decision makers.



# **Cyber Risk Assessment**

# **Connecting the threats with the risks**

The output of the threat modeling exercise becomes a baseline for the cyber risk assessment

Defining the risks that could result from each identified threat scenario

Defining the controls that address each identified risk

#### The outcome

#### Identifying the threat surface and risk profile of the specific setup

The threat modeling and risk assessment exercises for each setup or defined scope lead to a unique output.

#### Creating a repeatable framework

By performing multiple models and assessments, a repeatable framework of threats, risks and controls can be created.

**BUT:** This framework cannot be "blindly" applied to new setups, as each setup is different and has a unique profile. However, it can assist with automating part of future assessments.

## **Example: API integration with a 3rd party**

**Step 1:** Identifying the threat scenarios that are applicable to this specific use case.

**Step 2a:** Translate each threat scenario to the related risks that could materialize in your environment.

**Step 2b:** Identify the controls that can (partially or fully) mitigate the identified risks.

\* The STRIDE methodology has been applied to this example.

\*\* This is a generic, indicative example. The list of threats and risks is not complete and the list of controls is not as specific as it needs to be.

	Threat scenario	(	Description of Risk and impact	Recommendation/Control
	Information Disclosure	*	Sensitive data leakage, which could result to reputational damage and/or immaterial financial penalties	Follow the guidelines on best practices from security to avoid introducing vulnerabilities in the code.
	Information Disclosure	•	Sensitive data leakage, which could result to reputational damage and/or immaterial financial penalties	Performance of a technical vulnerability assessment and remediation of all critical- and high-risk vulnerabilities identified according to the defined SLAs.
	Information Disclosure	*	Lack of security monitoring of the web application might result in sensitive data leakage that is not timely detected.	Route traffic through a Web Application Firewall (WAF).
	Spoofing	*	Improper secret safeguarding could lead to secret leakage and spoofing attacks.	Store the API keys following the relevant security guidelines.
	Denial of Service	•	Loss of availability due to denial of service attacks.	Implement a throttling or rate limiting solution to the API endpoints.

# **Risk Scoring Methodology**

# Adopting a quantitative risk scoring approach

### Why?

- Granularity of risk assessment results
- **Risk scoring consistency** due to concrete guidance
- **Clarity** for the prioritization of workload

The threat-focused risk scoring methodologies that will be reviewed are **DREAD**, **CVSS** and **OWASP's risk rating methodology**.

# **Threat-focused risk scoring: DREAD**



#### Rating is based on answering 5 questions:

- 1. How bad would an attack be?
- 2. How easy is it to reproduce the attack?
- 3. How much work is it to launch the attack?
- 4. How many people will be impacted?
- 5. How easy is it to discover the threat?

### Example - How?

- For each identified risk, assign a **score per category** considering the respective question.
  - Indicative scoring example: 3 high risk, 2 medium risk, 1 low risk
- The **total score of the identified risk** is obtained by adding the values for all categories and concluding in which bucket does the risk belong.
  - Indicative total scoring buckets: 12-15 high risk, 8-11 medium risk, 5-7 low risk
- The **overarching system/application risk score** may inherit the highest calculated risk score associated with it, depending on the risk appetite

### **Threat-focused risk scoring: CVSS**



### **Threat-focused risk scoring: CVSS example**

Base Score Metrics				
Exploitability Metrics	Scope (S)*			
Attack Vector (AV)*	Unchanged (S:U) Changed (S:C)			
Network (AV:N) Adjacent Network (AV:A) Local (AV:L) Physical (AV:P)	Impact Metrics			
Attack Complexity (AC)*	Confidentiality Impact (C)*			
Low (AC:L) High (AC:H)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) High (C:H)			
Privileges Required (PR)*	Integrity Impact (I)*			
None (PR:N) Low (PR:L) High (PR:H)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) High (I:H)			
User Interaction (UI)*	Availability Impact (A)*			
None (UI:N) Required (UI:R)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) High (A:H)			

\* - All base metrics are required to generate a base score.

Temporal Score Metrics					
Exploit Code Maturity (E)					
Not Defined (EX) Unproven that exploit exists (E:U) Proof of concept co Remediation Level (RL)	de (E:P) Functional exploit exists (E:F) High (E:H)				
Not Defined (RL:X)         Official fix (RL:O)         Temporary fix (RL:T)         Workaroun           Report Confidence (RC)         Vertice         V	d (RL:W) Unavailable (RL:U)				
Not Defined (RC:X) Unknown (RC:U) Reasonable (RC:R) Confirmed (R	RC:C)				
Environmental Score Metrics Exploitability Metrics Attack Vector (MAV)	Impact Metrics Confidentiality Impact (MC)	Impact Subscore Modifiers Confidentiality Requirement (CR)			
Not Defined (MAV2X)         Network (MAV:N)         Adjacent Network (MAV:A)           Local (MAV:L)         Physical (MAV:P)         Attack Complexity (MAC)	Not Defined (MC:X)         None (MC:N)         Low (MC:L)           High (MC:H)         Integrity Impact (MI)         Integrity Impact (MI)	Not Defined (CR:X)         Low (CR:L)           Medium (CR:M)         High (CR:H)           Integrity Requirement (IR)			
Not Defined (MACX) Low (MAC:L) High (MAC:H) Privileges Required (MPR) Not Defined (MPR) Note (MPR/M) Low (MPR/M) High (MPR/M)	Not Defined (MI:X) None (MI:N) Low (MI:L) High (MI:H) Availability Impact (MA)	Not Defined (IR:X)         Low (IR:L)         Medium (IR:M)           High (IR:H)         Availability Requirement (AR)			
Not Defined (MURX:)         None (MURX:)         LOW (MPR:L)         Fight (MPR:H)           Vsc Defined (MUI:X)         None (MUI:N)         Required (MUI:R)           Scope (MS)	Not Defined (MA:X) None (MA:N) Low (MA:L) High (MA:H)	Not Defined (AR:X)         Low (AR:L)           Medium (AR:M)         High (AR:H)			

# Threat-focused risk scoring: OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

### How?

- For each identified risk, assign a **score per factor**.
- Calculating the average score of impact and likelihood per risk as the risk score,
- The **overarching system/application risk score** may inherit the highest calculated risk score associated with it, depending on the risk appetite.



## **Threat-focused risk scoring: OWASP example**

#### Likelihood factors

#### **Threat Agent Factors**

Skills required	Security penetration skills [1]	
Motive	Possible reward [4]	~
Opportunity	Deportunity Some access or resources required [7]	
Population Size	Anonymous Internet users [9]	~
Vulnerability Factors		
Easy of Discovery	Difficult [3]	~
Ease of Exploit	Difficult [3]	~
Awareness	Hidden [4]	~
Intrusion Detection	Logged without review [8]	~
Score		

#### Impact factors

#### **Technical Impact Factors**

Non-Compliance

Privacy violation

Loss of confidentiality	Extensive non-sensitive data disclosed [6]		
Loss of Integrity	Minimal seriously corrupt data [3]	~	
Loss of Availability	Extensive primary services interrupted [7]	~	
Loss of Accountability	Attack fully traceable to individual [1]	~	
Business Impact Factors			
Financial damage	Significant effect on annual profit [7]	~	
Reputation damage	Minimal damage [1]	~	

V

V

Clear violation [5]

Hundreds of people [5]

#### Overall Risk Severity = Likelihood x Impact

	Impact		
Likelihood	Low	Medium	High
Low	Low	Low	Medium
Medium	Low	Medium	
High	Medium		Critical



Thanks

# Appendix

### **Resources**

### Threat modeling

- Definition of threat modeling
- <u>Threat Modeling: 12 Available Methods</u>
- <u>STRIDE</u>
  - The STRIDE per Element Chart
  - <u>STRIDE-per-Interaction</u>
- Security Cards: A Security Threat Brainstorming Kit
- How Well Do You Know Your Personae Non Gratae?
- <u>Attack Trees</u>
- hTMM: A Hybrid Threat Modeling Method
- PASTA Risk-centric Threat Modeling
- QTMM: Software and attack centric integrated threat modeling for quantitative risk assessment
- <u>LINDDUN</u>
- <u>Trike</u>

Additional threat modeling resources:

- VAST modeling
- <u>Cybersecurity Threat Modeling with OCTAVE</u>

### **Resources**

### Threat-focused risk scoring

- DREAD (risk assessment model)
- <u>Application Threat Modeling using DREAD and STRIDE</u>
- <u>CVSS (v3.1 Specification Document)</u>
- <u>CVSS calculator Vulnerability Metrics</u>
- <u>CVSS Calculator example</u>
- Introduction and implementation OWASP Risk Rating Management
- OWASP risk calculator