



Be prepared against today's threats with TIBER

in Rob Wassink (DNB) & in Vincent Waart (EY)

ISACA Square Table 28 October 2020





TIBER-NL: Background



De Universiteit Maastricht (UM) heeft losgeld betaald aan de criminelen achter de gijzelsoftware die de universiteit al meer dan een week in zijn ban houdt, melden ingewijden aan <u>Observant</u>, de onafhankelijke krant van de universiteit. Het zou hierbij gaan om een paar ton. Een woordvoerder van de universiteit wil het bericht niet aan NU.nl bevestigen, maar kan het ook niet ontkennen.



FINANCIAL

Equifax to pay customers \$380.5 million as part of final breach settlement



The judge's decision Monday represents the final approval of a settlement deal initially proposed in July. (Flickr)






TIBER-NL: Big new in the Netherlands







TIBER-NL: The making of







TIBER-NL: Participants from 2019 till 2021



Financial Core Infrastructure (FCI)



Pension Providers




Insurance Companies



PLAY VIDEO



TIBER-NL: Introduction




Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dXf96mot2A





TIBER-NL: Process







Cyber Kill Chain









Example attack: Maastricht University



 Malicious Office files spread via email to targeted individuals



2. Workstations and Virtual Desktops infected with SDBBot malware



3. Manual spread over the network with Meterpreter to more Workstations and Virtual Desktops



4. Multiple Windows Servers compromised, likely via EternalBlue



5. Compromised workstations used to run tools to explore environment and AD



 Meterpreter used on another server, Domain Admin credentials found



7. Domain Admin credentials used to login on Domain Controller



8. Preparations for deployment of ransomware and removal of McAfee



9. Domain Admin account used to deploy malware to servers



10. Ransomware encrypts the files on 267 servers





TIBER vs. Red Teaming

What?	Red Teaming	TIBER
Testing Cyber Resilience	\checkmark	✓
Controlled environment	\checkmark	✓
Realistic scenario's	\checkmark	✓
'Carte Blanche' for attackers	×	✓
Targets live systems	×	✓
Sharing Results with community	×	√
International accreditation	×	√





"What would you hope to learn from a Red Teaming or TIBER assessment?"





TIBER-EU

TIBER-NL

TIBER-EU

TIBER-BE

TIBER-DK

TIBER-IE

TIBER-RO

TIBER-DE


TIBER-IT

TIBER-SE

TIBER-NO

TIBER-FI

CBEST (UK)







Experiences with TIBER

Key success factors

- White team members
- 2. Involve third party service providers
- 3. Open communication between White/Red team
- 4. Trust between providers and test subject
- 5. Scope
- 6. Scenario identification

Overall recommendations

- Ensure you prepare yourself for a TIBER assessment
- 2. Identify Critical Business Functions
- 3. Basic security hygiene
- 4. Perform table top exercises
- 5. Perform purple team sessions
- 6. Perform a Red Team test before TIBER and remediate findings





Links to TIBER documentation

- TIBER framework documentation
- in Rob Wassink (DNB)
- in Vincent Waart (EY)